Introduction
The direct and formal relationship between unsustainable forestry practices and global climate change goes back at least to the late 1970's. Since the Declaration of the World Climate Conference in 1979, the international community acknowledged that deforestation, and changes of land use, such as agriculture and pastoral practices, were contributing to the increased amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. 2 In 1989, the Noordwijk Declaration on Atmospheric Pollution and Climatic Change recognized a growing international preoccupation with the alteration of the composition of the Earth's atmosphere due to anthropogenic activities; stressed out the importance of sustainable forestry, reforestation, afforestation and conservation activities; and called for a world net forest growth of 12 million hectares per year in the beginning of the 21st Century.
3 Shortly after IPCC's First Assessment report, the Second World Climate Conference, held in Geneva from 29 October to 7 November 1990, called upon the international community to take measures to increase "sinks" of greenhouse gases. 4 This was the scenario on forest and forestry leading to the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the formal and fundamental pillar to the current climate change legal regime. Among general norms and principles, the Convention called upon developed countries, based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibility, to adopt binding commitments envisioning greenhouse gases emissions reductions and limitations. In mitigating the adverse impacts of emissions limitations and reductions commitments, the Convention allowed the Parties to implement policies and measures domestically, and/or jointly.
This present study focuses on the evolving debates on forest and forestry activities implemented jointly, more specifically those under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), 15 years after the UNFCCC, and 10 years after the Kyoto Protocol. Launched by COP-1 through the so-called Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) Pilot Phase, it was the Kyoto Protocol that effectively created the flexibility mechanisms that would allow for joint implementation of policies and measures under the climate change regime. Articles 6 and 12 respectively envisioned the joint implementation (JI) (between developed countries and economies in transition), and the clean development mechanism (CDM) (between developed and developing countries). The overall objective of this paper is to identify the current political, policy, legal, and technical challenges inherent to CDM project-based forest and forestry activities, provide with an assessment of likely trends for upcoming commitment periods and, finally, propose viable solutions to overcome future obstacles currently preventing further developments in this area of the CDM.
Convention,
11 but without a legal definition being provided.
12 a. The Science Linking Forest and Forestry Activities to the Climate Change Legal Regime: "Sinks", "Reservoirs", and "Sources" of CO2.
Carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) is the dominant and most important greenhouse gas 13 among the five others listed by the climate change legal regime.
14 Carbon dioxide is also the parameter for measuring other greenhouse gases emissions. 15 In this context, forests play a role by directly absorbing and storing CO 2 , but also, indirectly, by offsetting other greenhouse gases emissions. 16 Growing forests and plants, through photosynthesis, have enormous capacities of carbon sequestration. Long established old-growth and mature forests can store significant amounts of carbon for long periods of time. 17 Nonetheless, when disturbed, forests no longer play a mitigation role in global warming. Rather, they become part of the problem, a considerable source of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ). 18 Whenever the capacity of the ecosystem to 11 UNFCC, supra note 7, art. 4.1(c). 12 Cf. (1998) . ("Not all greenhouse gases are created equal; different gases have different "global warming potentials" (GWPs). The technical definition of global warming potentials is the cumulative radiative forcing between the present and some chosen time horizon caused by a unit mass of gas emitted now, expressed relative to that for some reference gas, typically CO2. Thus, for example, the global warming potential of methane is 56 times that of CO2 or, put another way, Methane is 56 times more potent in causing global warming than is CO2 in a century. The global warming potential for nitrous oxide is 280 and the global warming potential is in the thousands for many of the HFCs, PFCs and SF6. Thus emitting one ton of these compounds into the atmosphere has dramatically higher impacts than emitting one ton of CO2 or even methane."). 16 19 As defined by the UNFCCC, article 1.9, a '"source" means any process or activity which releases a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas into the atmosphere." 20 . Reflecting this common scientific understanding, article 4.1(d) of the Convention reinstated the role of forest conservation practices and called upon all parties, while respecting the principle of common but differentiated responsibility, 21 to promote and cooperate in the enhancement of sinks and reservoirs. The definitions and legal status of forest and forestry that legally supported project activities under the climate change regime experienced two distinct phases: the first one, based on the generic concepts of "sink", "reservoir" and "source" provided by the mother Convention up to the Kyoto Protocol; and a second one, with more precise and specific notions provided by the Kyoto Protocol and subsequent Conference of the Parties (COPs) and Meeting of the Parties (MOPs). 
i. Definitions and Legal Status in the UNFCCC and Up to the Kyoto Protocol
The UNFCCC presents broad definitions of "sink", "reservoir", and "source" 24 to ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/007/y5647e/y5647e00.pdf. [hereinafter FAO Climate Change and the Forest Sector] ("In nature, GHGs are constantly entering and leaving the atmosphere. The oceans exchange CO2 and other GHGs with the atmosphere and hold CO2 dissolved or precipitated out in sediments. Actively growing trees and other plants capture CO2 from the atmosphere, combined with water through photosynthesis and create sugar and more stable carbohydrates. They may store a significant part of the carbon absorbed for appreciable lengths of time, from years to millennia. Carbohydrates become the building blocks and energy supply for most of life on Earth. Eventually, when plants and animals die, CO2 returns to the atmosphere. When wood products and other organic materials burn or decompose, they also release CO2."). 19 IPCC Special Report LULUCF, supra note 17, at 4. 20 UNFCCC art. 1.9 supra note 7. 21 See generally PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 285 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 2003) (1995) (discussing in deeper details the principle of common but differentiated responsibility). 22 UNFCCC art. 4.1(d), supra note 7 ("All parties taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities and their specific national and regional development priorities, objectives and circumstances, shall: Promote sustainable management, and promote and cooperate in the conservation and enhancement, as appropriate, of sinks and reservoirs of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, including biomass, forests and oceans as well as other terrestrial, coastal and marine ecosystems;"). 23 See generally IPCC Special Report LULUCF, supra note 17, at Preface (stressing the importance of setting clear definitions for forests and forestry activities, the later encompassing afforestation, reforestation, and deforestation, and that "the challenge is to derive a set of definitions that are simple and consistent with the aims of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol."). 24 UNFCCC, supra note 7, arts. 1.8, 1.7 and 1.9. ("'Sink' means any process, activity or mechanism which removes a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of greenhouse gas from the atmosphere."; 'reservoir' means a component or components of the climate system where a greenhouse gas or a precursor of greenhouse gas is stored."; 'source' means any process or activity which releases a greenhouse gas, an aerosol which the concept of forest and forestry are subsumed and, therefore, supported project activities during the so-called Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) Pilot Phase. 25 The primary concern during the negotiations at the three Conferences of the Parties (COP-1, COP-2 and COP-3, respectively 1995, 1996, and 1997) following the UNFCCC was to define quantified emissions reductions and limitations for developed countries. 26 Issues relating to project-based forest and forestry activities were primarily a cost-effective 27 way to make emissions reductions and limitations commitments feasible in the short term and, consequently, an important negotiation tool for the imposition of cap commitments upon developed countries.
28
Only during the fourth session of the Conference of the Parties (COP-4) (almost seven years after the UNFCCC) that a more specific legal regime for land use, land-use change and forestry started to emerge, one that would eventually encompass project-based forest and forestry activities. 29 Legally, though, at least until the Kyoto Protocol, the formal connection between forest and forestry with sink and reservoir was made by article 4.1(d) of the Convention. This provision called all Parties to promote actions to enhance sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases, including forests.
In this sense, from such ample definitions, on one hand, the legal status of forest and forestry is inferred: "sink" and "reservoir". On the other hand, because forests can also emit CO 2 when disturbed, according to the Convention, they could also be deemed as "sources" of greenhouse gases. 30 or a precursor of a greenhouse gas into the atmosphere."). 25 That activities implemented jointly should be compatible with and supportive of national environment and development priorities and strategies, contribute to cost-effectiveness in achieving global benefits and could be conducted in a comprehensive manner covering all relevant sources, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases;"). 26 See MICHAEL GRUBB, CHRISTIAAN VROLIJK & DUNCAN BRACK, THE EMERGION INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR CLIMATE CHANGE: STRUCTURES AND OPTIONS AFTER BERLIN 7 (The Royal Institute of International Affairs 1995) (assessing the outcome of the first Conference of the Parties, known as the Berlin Mandate, for whom " [t] he Mandate calls for a process to begin to strengthen commitments beyond 2000. This process should lead the industrialized world to 'elaborate policies and measures', and to 'set quantified limitation and reduction objectives within specified time-frames, such as 2005, 2010 and 2020, for their anthropogenic emissions'. Negotiations are to be completed by early 1997 in order that the results can be adopted at 'COP-3'(…). The expectation is that a protocol or other legal agreement will be negotiated at COP-3 defining emission constraints for Annex 1 Parties potentially up to the year 20202."). 27 See Joel N. Swisher, Joint Implementation Under the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change: Technical and Institutional Challenges, 2 MITIGATION ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 57, 60 (1997) (emphasizing that "there are low-cost opportunities for carbon storage in the forestry sector"). 28 See also id., supra note 27, at 58 (stressing that "expect Annex I countries to implement too large a share of the emission reductions could be physically or technically infeasible and would likely be inefficient"). 29 In practical terms, this means that whenever the climate change legal regime refers to enhancement, promotion, and sustainable management of "sinks" and "reservoirs", and calls for action to address anthropogenic emissions by "sources", it is including and promoting actions on forests and forestry activities. 31 The importance of this empirical analysis consists on the fact that the lack of more precise definitions and legal status for forest and forestry in this first period up until the Kyoto Protocol, led to no activity limitation whatsoever for those participating in the Activities Implemented Jointly Pilot Phase. 32 37 See generally GRUBB ET AL., supra note 26, at 2 (explaining that the purpose of the SBSTA is to function as "the main interlocutor between the scientific world and the Convention process;" and stressing that the SBSTA is different from the IPCC). 38 See OBERTHÜR ET AL., supra note 10, at 132 ("Although the issue of sinks always loomed in the background of the negotiations prior to Kyoto, serious negotiations on this only began at AGBM 8 in October 1997. At this meeting, many Parties realized that there was almost no factual basis on which to take a decision. The whole issue of LUCF (Land-use Change and Forestry), as it was finally referred to, was surrounded by
The rationale behind a specific legal regime was to make the Convention's ultimate objective feasible, by allowing developed countries to offset part of their quantified emissions reductions and limitations commitments through jointly project-based practices under flexibility mechanisms, 39 (one approach) and through the promotion and enhancement of sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases domestically (another approach). 40 Articles 3.3 and 3.4 of the Kyoto Protocol set the stage for the beginning of a specific regulatory regime to deal with land-use change and forestry activities. The first decision carrying on the mandate established by the aforementioned provisions was decision 9/CP.4, taken pursuant COP-4 in Buenos Aires, 1999. From then on, this regulatory regime became known as "land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF)". 41 At a first stage, Parties opted for limiting LULUCF activities to afforestation, reforestation and deforestation practices, 42 (the later meaning "avoided deforestation" 43 ) while providing for enough flexibility to the inclusion of additional activities.
44
Afforestation and reforestation are both defined as the human-induced conversion of non-forested areas into forested, but with a slightly difference: the prior presupposes that the converted land into forested area has not been forested for at least 50 years, while the later is the conversion of land that once was forested into forested area, but limited to those areas that did not have forest on December 31, 1989. 46 Rajamani, supra note 30, at 223 ("At COP-6, the Umbrella Group argued in favor of including additional activities in the first commitment period. However, the AOSIS and the EU opposed it.").
additional activities during COP-7 in Marrakech 47 , adding revegetation, forest management, cropland management, and grazing land management to those activities conducted domestically, but excluding them from jointly implemented project-based activities. 48 From the newly-established legal regime on LULUCF, definitions on activities, although broad in nature, 49 were useful operational guidance on handling this one form of accountability under the UNFCCC. Thus, the Annex to decision 16/CMP.1 provided definitions to "forest", "afforestation", "reforestation", "deforestation", "revegetation", "forest management", "cropland management", and "grazing land management". 50
c. Two Different Approaches to Accounting for Forests and Forestry Activities
Because developed countries were concerned that reliance solely upon domestic measures to curb anthropogenic greenhouse gases emissions could impair their national economies by imposing a significant financial burden as a result of mandatory emissions reductions, the Kyoto Protocol envisioned accountability through market-based flexibility mechanisms: emissions trading, joint implementation, and clean development mechanism.
51 For forest and forestry, this scenario opened two possible approaches: first, accounting domestically for LULUCF; and second, through project-based activities abroad limited to afforestation and reforestation practices.
i. Accounting for Domestic Land Use, Land-Use Change, and Forestry Activities (LULUCF)
To some countries, accounting for LULUCF could offset up to 10% of their national gross emissions. For others, due to demographic and land-use patterns, sequestration potentials from enhancement of sinks are limited. As a consequence, accounting for LULUCF activities became a big part of the interests at stake during the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, dividing the Parties considerably and impairing much of the progress on a common and satisfactory agreement.
52
Through Decision 11/CP.7 the Parties addressed some of the previous concerns, while also requesting the SBSTA and the IPCC to develop and elaborate guidelines, 47 Decision 11/CP.7, supra note 45, at 54. monitoring and reporting methodologies. 53 Following the Parties' request, IPCC issued a report on good practice guidance for land use, land-use change and forestry, 54 and another one on definitions and Methodological Options to Inventory Emissions from Direct Human Induced Degradation of Forests and Devegetation of Other Vegetation Types. 55 The IPCC work and SBSTA advices were based on the general principles governing accountability for LULUCF activities undertaken domestically by Annex I countries.
56
Under this framework regulatory regime governing LULUCF accountability, for the first commitment period 57 a selected domestic forestry activity can add or subtract to an Annex I Party's assigned amount, whether the practice constitute a sink or a source of carbon dioxide, respectively.
58 Accountable forestry activities include afforestation, reforestation, deforestation, regevetation, forest, cropland and grazing land management.
59
Any improvement made domestically using one or more of the abovementioned listed forestry activities will add to a Party's assigned amount ("credits") for the first commitment period, so long as a formal selection of any or all of them is made timely (identification in the Party's annual report), demonstration that the chosen activities had occurred since 1990, and are human-induced. 60 One the other hand, whenever verifiable human-induced changes in land use and forestry results in a net emission of greenhouse gas, a subtraction on an Annex I Party's assigned amount shall take place.
61
The estimates are based on annual national inventories and communications 62 on anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks that Annex I Parties are required to submit. 63 The information provided is used in the establishment of assigned amounts. 64 A limitation in accounting, either positively (crediting) or negatively (debiting) for domestic LULUCF activities is imposed individually to each Annex I Party, and measured in metric tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent per year. Those quantified 53 Decision 11/CP.7, supra note 45, at 54. 54 56 See Decision 16/CMP.1 annex, supra note 48, at 3. 57 Kyoto Protocol art. 3.7, supra note 14 (establishing the first commitment period from 2008-2012, within which Annex I Parties will have to meet their quantified limitation and reduction objectives set forth in Annex B to the Protocol). 58 Decision 16/CMP.1 annex, supra note 48, at 8. 59 Id., at 6. 60 Id., at 6. 61 Id., at 8. 62 See generally Halvorssen, supra note 39, at 360 (" [T] he UNFCCC required all Parties to develop inventories of anthropogenic emissions and measures to mitigate climate change. Furthermore, the UNFCCC, called "national communications." To fulfill their reporting obligations, Annex I Parties were given six months from the entry into force of the UNFCCC to submit their reports, while non-Annex I Parties (developing countries) were given three years and the least developed States were not given a deadline."). 63 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14, art. 5. 64 Decision 16/CMP.1 annex, supra note 48, at 8. limitations to be subtracted or added to a Party's assigned amount are found in an Appendix to Decision 16/CMP.1.
65

ii. Accounting for Forestry Activities under Project-Based Flexibility Mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol
Annex I Parties can claim credits against their assigned amounts for forestry project activities implemented jointly with another Annex I Party (Joint Implementation) or with a non-Annex I Party (Clean Development Mechanism). 66 The origin of joint projects goes back to the text of the Convention, 67 more precisely article 4.2(a) that generically mentioned the possibility of Annex I parties to implement policies and measures jointly.
68
On the road to Kyoto, and during the negotiations of the protocol at COP-3, flexibility was a highly contentious issue among Parties. One the one side, the JUSSCANNZ 69 countries envisioned the opportunity to invest in projects abroad as a cheap way to mitigate their commitments, especially those related to forest and forestry project activities 70 , and the only feasible way to achieve them without hurting their economies. On the other side, the G-77 plus China 71 and the European Union faced them as a loophole in the Protocol. The prior feared the so-called "carbon colonialism" or "eco-colonialism", 72 the later concern was basically on ethical grounds. 73 Opponents saw forest and forestry projects abroad as allowing Annex I countries to invest in developing countries without having to take any stronger domestic mitigation measures.
74
The conflicts were partially resolved with the parties agreeing upon limiting forestry 65 Id., at 7. 66 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14, arts. 6 and 12. 67 71 Id., at 5 ("The Group of 77 (and China) is the main negotiating group of developing countries, representing over 120 Parties in many international negotiations. The group includes countries with very different objectives, including OPEC and AOSIS"). 72 Costa, supra note 43, at 4. 73 See generally, Raoul Weiler, The Kyoto Protocol And Its Socio-Ethical Aspects, in READING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL ETHICAL ASPECTS OF THE CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 53-54 (Etienne Vermeersch ed., 2005) ("The emission trading transforms a common good -the atmosphere-into a commercial good. The trading process turns the principle of the 'polluter pays' into the opposite 'the polluter buys his way out'. From the ethical point of view the Protocol does not provide the necessary warrantees for ethical practices."). 74 See GRUBB ET AL., supra note 52, at 87 (detailing the conflict of interests around the debate on flexible mechanisms).
activities to afforestation and reforestation projects, the exclusion of nuclear activities, 75 and the requirement that project-based activities shall be supplemental to domestic measures and policies. 76 Subsequently, since the Marrakech Accords (COP-7) the debate around this controversy is void, due to the express embracement of forestry activities by decision 11/CP.7. This section aims at building and examining the CDM forest and forestry projectactivities legal and institutional framework and how they were influenced by the conflicting interests surrounding them, the evolution of scientific and technological knowledge, and the practice provided during the AIJ pilot phase.
a. The Evolution of the Legal Framework
A legal framework for forest and forest project-activities in the CDM is a subproduct of a broader regulatory regime for joint implementation flexibility mechanisms. Articles 4.2(a), (b), (d), and 3.3 of the UNFCCC are the main pillars of the joint implementation regulatory regime. 78 The first action in this regard was taken at COP-1, in Berlin, 1995, when the parties agreed upon an Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) Pilot Phase. 79 Shortly after, the Kyoto Protocol not only embraced the concept of Joint Implementation among Annex I Parties, but also extended it to non-Annex I countries (Clean Development Mechanism). pilot phase did not provide credits against the, then, not yet agreed upon developed countries' assigned amounts. The AIJ pilot phase was voluntarily in nature.
Moreover, the pilot phase embraced participation of non-Annex I countries hosting project-based activities undertaken thereof. This experimental period also covered generically "all relevant sources, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases;", allowing for ample use of forest and forestry project activities. The fact is that, "[t]he importance of information, training, appropriate capacity and institutions for the development of CDM projects is underlined by experience from the pilot phase of Activities Implemented Jointly.".
82
The Parties' experience during the pilot phase showed geographic trends and potential social and environmental benefits related to forest and forestry project activities, which provided substantial background on future negotiations. 83 All these elements were crucial during the discussions over flexibility mechanisms in Kyoto, during the COP-3, and beyond, when negotiators faced the dilemma, and conflicting pressures of whether to include or not forest and forestry activities in the CDM. 
A Brief Assessment of the AIJ Pilot Phase Main Reports, and Positive Outcomes
Through the AIJ pilot phase reporting requirements, the SBSTA was able to produce annual synthesis reports, before recommending a comprehensive review of the pilot phase, which was completed and sent to the COP-5 in Bonn, 1999. 85 Specifically with regard to forest and forestry project activities, those annual synthesis reports and the final review of the AIJ pilot phase provided useful data on important geographical trends, technical challenges (monitoring and reporting), social and environmental benefits and impacts, possible global benefits (in comparison with other types of project-activities), and implications on national economies (helping developing countries to achieve sustainable development, and developed countries in achieving their commitments under the climate change regime). 86 The figures bellow, excerpted from the SBSTA synthesis reports on AIJ pilot phase, illustrate the aforementioned elements of the experiences gained during this experimental period: 84 See id., at 5 (providing an "[a]ssessment of environmental benefits related to the mitigation of climate change that would not have occurred in the absence of AIJ, covering all relevant sources, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases and the methods used to measure, monitor and independently verify these emissions, including by type of project, and other environmental benefits."). Figure  3 .2 shows that while numbering 15 out of 139 projects (roughly 10 per cent of the total), forest conservation and forestry activities accounted for 35 per cent of the abatement impact. The data demonstrates that although representing a smaller portion of the total number of projects, sequestration potentials of forest and forestry activities are significantly higher in a comparison with other types of projects. In addition, the data collected from different years shows that the number of forest and forestry project activities decreased proportionately to the rising on scientific and technical knowledge and certainty on the complexities of processes related to these activities.
87
In its first synthesis report, the SBSTA highlighted that "most data on the costs and the amount of GHG abated are only estimates and are, therefore, not a suitable basis for analysis;".
88 When the report was released, the Parties were in the final preparations for the Kyoto negotiations. The IPCC had not yet released its special report on LULUCF, which only happened in 2000. 89 The first specific decision on forestry activities in the CDM was only agreed upon in 2003 at COP-9 (decision 19/CP.9), 90 the same year in which the IPCC Report on Good Practice Guidance for Land Use, Land-use Change and Forestry was released. 91 This chronological scenario explains the proportionality between growing consensus on the challenges of forest and forestry project activities and the consequent decrease in their total share (both in quantity and in share of GHG abatement impact) in a comparison with other types of projects, deemed much simpler.
As to the geographical distribution of forest conservation and forestry projects, and their environmental and socio-economic impacts, the 1999 Subsidiary Bodies' report on the issues to be addressed in the review of the pilot phase provided useful source of information for a more comprehensive assessment of the pilot phase. With regard to socioeconomic aspects of projects undertaken during the pilot phase, the Subsidiary Bodies verified an increase in capacity-building through enhancement of procedural and institutional experience, and the Parties reported "active involvement of local communities, increased public awareness, and the maintenance of natural heritage and historical site".
92
In this same path, the report highlighted that host Parties, most developing countries, were being able to attract financial resources and direct them towards national 87 Cf. development goals. Despite the statement made by the Subsidiary Bodies that socioeconomic and environmental factors were not sufficiently addressed, specifically with respect to forest and forestry activities, the Parties reported environmental benefits on "fostering biodiversity, improving water and air quality and reducing erosion of hydrological resources".
93
In the AIJ pilot phase review report, some Parties linked their development goals to forestry and land-use. 94 Indeed, Figure 3 .3 demonstrates that those Parties, despite not identified in the report, are most likely to be developing countries in the Latin American region. Figure 3 .3 shows that most of forest preservation and reforestation projects, and roughly half of afforestation activities were taking place in Latin America and the Caribbean region. Not surprisingly, considering that a great percentage of the remaining tropical forests in the world are concentrated in Latin America.
95
A better sense of the region's potentials for these types of projects can be excerpted from the fact that the data presented does not list Brazil, 96 by far the country with the greater portion of remaining tropical forests. 97 In addition to the resources availability element, the costs of forest and forestry GHG abatement practices are considerably lower in developing countries, which contributed to Latin America's share of the market in hosting preservation, reforestation and afforestation project activities. 
The Main Challenges Encountered During the AIJ Pilot Phase
The major problems encountered by the Parties during the implementation of project activities were also summarized by the AIJ pilot phase reviewing report. Highlighting common constrains during the pilot phase was a useful tool for improvements in the flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, particularly in the CDM that encompasses developing countries' participation. 99 Among general challenges and obstacles to all types of projects during the pilot phase, and specifically those related to forest and forestry were:
(a) differences in the investment climate; (b) cultural differences; (c) insufficient infrastructure; (d) institutional capacity; (e) relative absence of investment companies; (f) lack of policy on AIJ and of a clear and transparent set of operational rules on the part of the host country; (g) lack of awareness in the private sector in host countries on opportunities represented by AIJ; (h) variations in the degree of knowledge and acceptance of AIJ by local stakeholders; (i) lack of capacity to produce comprehensive AIJ project proposals; (j) existing preferences, driven by established business partnerships, strategic considerations and political priorities for investors for particular areas; (k) differences in GHG reduction costs and in transaction costs due to, inter alia, some of the above points; and (l) current exclusion of crediting for GHG reductions or removals by sinks;…. (e) high transaction costs; and (f) the uncertainty regarding two major interlinked methodological issues, the identification of the project baseline and additionality. 100 All in all, it is worth noticing that the AIJ pilot phase was characterized by the lack of stronger oversight mostly due to a weak regulatory regime. Therefore, even though the data presented were useful in assisting negotiators to model the regulatory framework for afforestation and reforestation practices in the CDM, and helped to indicate trends and potentials, the results lack accuracy. Nonetheless, the AIJ pilot phase was crucial in raising the Parties' concerns over the technical, scientific and socio-economic challenges related to forest and forestry project-activities, which inevitably constituted one of the leading factors to the development of a stronger and tighter regulatory regime specifically to deal with forest and forestry activities in the CDM. ii. The CDM of the Kyoto Protocol 99 Michaelowa, supra note 82, at 202. 100 SBSTA & SBI 1999 Report, supra note 83, at 6, 10. 101 See generally Costa, supra note 43, at 2 (providing further analysis on forestry projects under the AIJ pilot phase).
The outcome of the COP-3 negotiations was that project-based joint implementation launched by the UNFCCC, and implemented by the pilot phase, ended up divided by the Kyoto Protocol into Joint Implementation (JI), and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Within the scope of this paper is worthy noticing that the final language of Article 12 (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol provided the CDM with threefold objective: assist nonAnnex I Parties in achieving sustainable development, contribute with the Convention's overall objective, and help developed countries in achieving their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments. 
iii. The Controversy Whether Forest and Forestry Activities Were Meant to be Included in the CDM
Prior to the negotiations at COP-3, in Kyoto, the Parties had before them the SBSTA synthesis report on activities implemented jointly under the pilot phase. 103 The report was noted by decision 10/CP.3 104 , and stressed out the existence of 6 ongoing forestry preservation and afforestation activities, with ample participation of developing countries in hosting the projects.
105
Opponents of the inclusion of sinks in the CDM 106 argued that Article 12 did not provide legal support for such inclusion. Their main argument was a comparison with Article 6 (JI), in which the inclusion of "sinks" is clearly stated, as opposed to Article 12 (CDM). In addition, the opposition also included the allegation that because sink projects could not be accurately measured, they did not meet Article 12.5(b)'s requirement that certification under the CDM should be on the basis of "[r]eal, measurable, and long-term benefits related to the mitigation of climate change;". 107 Indeed, whereas Article 6 (JI) of the Kyoto Protocol expressly referred to projects providing enhancement of removals by sinks, Article 12 (CDM) generally states project activities without further specifications whatsoever. 108 However, a closer analysis of the climate change regime did not provide for the exclusion of sink projects from the CDM. 109 First, because JI in the UNFCCC was the origin of the CDM, and under the pilot phase forest and forestry activities were being utilized amply by Annex I and non-Annex I Parties. Second, because Article 12 also did not specify any other type of projects, such as renewable energy, or energy efficiency. It was simply limited to stating the CDM 106 See Costa, supra note 43, at 8 (stressing out that the main opponents to the inclusion of forestry in the CDM were the EU, China and India, and that proponents were Latin American countries and the Umbrella Group -Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Iceland). 107 GRUBB ET AL., supra note 52, at 241. 108 Compare Kyoto Protocol art. 6, supra note 14 (expressly referring to enhancement of removals by sinks of greenhouse gases), with Kyoto Protocol art. 12, supra note 14 (broadly defining the clean development mechanism). 109 See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 15, at 645 ("Both the Framework Convention and the Kyoto Protocol clearly contemplate that sinks such as forest would be within the ambit of the climate regime.").
objectives, and setting general operational guidance. 110 The omission only constitutes inaccuracy in the written language utilized in the Kyoto Protocol, but nothing beyond that. As per the impossibility to measure and monitor forestry projects, currently approved monitoring methodologies by the CDM Executive Board demonstrate that although harder than other types of projects, forestry activities can be monitored and measured.
A final common ground was only possible due to some degree of leverage that countries pushing for the inclusion of forestry activities (Umbrella Group) had, 111 particularly the U.S., Japan, Canada and Australia, 112 so that the Protocol could enter into force by achieving its required target of 55 per cent of global anthropogenic GHG emissions. 113 Considering that the U.S. along with other Umbrella Group countries account for over half of the world's emissions, their engagement was crucial to the Protocol's success. Another important element relied on the fact that the EU was not going to accept the inclusion of nuclear projects in the CDM. In order to avoid any attempt from the U.S., other developed country, or even China and India to push forward the debate on the inclusion of nuclear energy projects, the EU allowed some flexibility and ended up accepting forestry activities in the CDM. 114 The controversy was finally settled at COP-7, in Marrakech, when negotiators agreed to include forestry in the CDM, but limited to afforestation and reforestation activities. After failing to reach consensus at COP-6, and COP-6 "bis" on the issue of land use, land-use change and forestry generally, progress made during those two sections of the conference of the Parties allowed a final agreement on the inclusion of forestry activities in the CDM at COP-7, in Marrakesh, 2001 . 116 The outcome of this meeting was called "Marrakesh Accords". 117 Through the Annex to a draft decision on LULUCF the Parties finally agreed on the inclusion of forestry projects in the CDM based on three pillars of eligibility and offsetting limitations, and regulatory flexibility for future commitment periods, as follow: 1) forestry in the CDM is limited to afforestation and reforestation activities; 2) addition limitation to a Parties' assigned amount of 1 per cent of base year emissions, times five (which represents 20% of an Annex I country overall target) 118 ; and 3) a regulatory regime for future commitment periods shall be decided during the negotiations on the second commitment period. 119 Overall, and at least for the first commitment period, the EU's main interests prevailed over the ones from the Umbrella Group. 120 The EU succeeded at banning nuclear projects in the CDM (decision 17/CP.7), and at limiting not only forestry to afforestation and reforestation, but also the amount accountable against an Annex I Party's assigned amount. 121 In practice, since the EU -Emissions Trading Scheme excluded carbon credits originated from LULUCF activities, 122 and considering European countries (and their private entities) constitute the vast majority of Annex I buyers (taking into account that the U.S. has not yet ratified the Kyoto Protocol), 123 the inclusion of forestry in the CDM did not affect significantly EU's interests for the first commitment period. On the other hand, the Umbrella Group, if not with the desired amplitude, inserted sinks in the CDM, and left open the debate for future commitment periods.
Once forestry made it to the CDM, and the Parties had established general eligibility and offsetting limitations and flexibility on the debate for future commitment periods, an operational regulatory regime became a requirement. Without further and specific progress at COP-8, in New Delhi, 2002, the Parties would agree upon a thorough regulatory regime for forestry in the CDM at COP-9, in Milan, 2003.
124 Decision 19/CP.9 set up modalities and procedures for afforestation and reforestation project activities under the CDM.
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Decision 19/CP.9 was also particularly important because it affirmed the principles of Decision 11/CP.7 on LULUCF, and envisioned a more flexible regulatory regime for small-scale forestry projects in the CDM, 126 following a model that the Parties had already implemented at COP-8 for other types of activities (renewable energy and energy efficiency) in the CDM (Annex II to decision 21/CP.8).
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The forestry legal framework in the CDM was completed for the first commitment period, when the Parties at COP-10 in Buenos Aires, 2004, agreed upon decision 14/CP.10 on simplified modalities and procedures for small-scale afforestation and reforestation 119 Decision 11/CP.7, supra note 45, at 60. 120 Table 3 .1 below aims at providing a chronological overview of the general, and specific legal provisions applicable to forestry project activities under the CDM. Convention's ultimate objective: to reduce anthropogenic emissions of GHGs. 131 To this end, institutions dealing with forestry in the CDM are a sub-product of a broader framework, one that relies upon the supreme bodies of the Convention and the Protocol, but also upon more specific institutions unique to the control and management of afforestation and reforestation projects in the CDM. The following two subsections break down the CDM forestry institutional framework.
i. Conference of the Parties (COPs) / Meeting of the Parties (MOPs)
With primary and exclusive decision-making power, the Conference of the Parties is the highest body on the institutional hierarchy, and from which the regulatory scheme emerges.
132 Therefore, the legality of the decisions on forestry in the CDM is derived from the powers conferred by the Convention to the Conference of the Parties, including the decision as to whether adopt a protocol. 133 The 1997 Kyoto Protocol, as a result of COP-3, expanded the specific CDM forestry institutional framework, 134 and also added to the Conference of the Parties the function of serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Protocol. The SBSTA is the advisory body to link the available scientific information to the decision-making process of the climate change regime. 136 It is different from the IPCC, and it was not designed to replace it. 137 Article 15 of the Kyoto Protocol determined that the subsidiary bodies created under the Convention remain in charge of providing scientific and technological advice and assistance to COPs serving as MOPs. 138 Within the CDM forestry institution framework, the SBSTA takes into account the work produced by the IPCC, FAO, International Forum on Forests, among other international institutions, and provides guidance on scientific, technical and technological matters related to afforestation and reforestation, and recommends decisions to the COP/MOP. 139 131 UNFCCC, supra note 7, art. 2 (stating the ultimate objective of the Convention). 132 See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 15, at 233 ("Much like a corporate body of directors, the conferences of the parties (CoPs) are the primary policy-making organs of most global environmental treaty regimes. The CoPs usually occur once every one or two years and conduct the major business of monitoring, updating revising, and enforcing the conventions."). 133 Another important organ in the CDM forestry institutional framework is the CDM Executive Board (EB). Featured in Article 12.4 of the Kyoto Protocol, the CDM Executive Board was implemented by decision 17/CP.7 to carry out the oversight function over activities in the CDM under the guidance and authority of the COP/MOP. 140 Through decision 17/CP.7, the COP/MOP expanded EB's supervisory role, adding to it decisionmaking power over approval of Designated Operational Entities (DOEs), 141 projects, including the final work on new methodologies, baseline and monitoring methodologies, and issuance of certified emission reduction (CER). 142 In sum, the EB is the executive body in charge of handling projects undertaken pursuant to the CDM, and all related matters thereof.
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iii. Designated Operational Entities (DOEs) & Afforestation / Reforestation, and Methodologies Working Groups
The CDM Executive Board can accredit operational entities known as Designated Operational Entities (DOEs) and recommend them to the COP/MOP for final designation. 144 The rationale behind the conception of DOEs is that by delegating to an independent company the validation of proposed CDM projects, and subsequent verification and certification emissions reductions, the EB preserves its oversight and decision-making role over proposed new methodologies, baselines and monitoring plans 145 , while counting on the efficiency of outside specialized private corporations to have a more agile process. 146 Should the EB had to operate the technical field work of validation, verification, and certification of each proposed project, the financial and human resources necessary would make the process unfeasible. 147 forestry. One of SBSTA's conclusions on the topic was an interpretation of Article 3.3 of the Kyoto Protocol. Many obstacles remained on different elements of implementing Article 3.3. The SBSTA report mainly recognized that additional technical information was needed in order to fully implement LULUCF activities under the Protocol and requested IPCC to elaborate a technical report on the topic. It also requested the Parties to submit data and suggested methods, modalities, rules and guidelines on additional human-induced activities could be included in Article 3.4. The report also called for a workshop of experts aiming at exploring the issues raised by the IPCC report. Finally the workshop called for the secretariat to liaise with the secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity and of the Convention to Combat Desertification, International Forum on Forests, the FAO and all other international agencies and organizations that could provide helpful information on the topic). . 141 FAO Working Paper 3, supra note 87, at 9 ("DOEs are accredited by the Executive Board and perform two functions: validating CDM projects, and verifying and certifying emissions reductions from projects. A designated operational entity shall not perform validation or verification and certification on the same CDM A/R project activity."). 142 Decision 17/CP.7 annex to draft decision, supra note 140, at 27. 143 Michaelowa, supra note 82, at 203. 144 Decision 17/CP.7, supra note 140, at 21. 145 See generally Michaelowa, supra note 82, at 203 (specifying the requirements for a company to be accredited as a DOE). 146 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change UNFCCC, The First Ten Years, at 87 (2004), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/first_ten_years_en.pdf. 147 See Costa, supra note 43, at 5 ("It became obvious that third-party certification was instrumental in the In addition, by working with different and independent DOEs in the validation, verification and certification stages, the EB institutional framework is constantly being crosschecked, diminishing the margin for imprecise certified emissions reductions. This scheme is particularly important in the CDM context, considering that non-Annex I countries have no emissions limitation commitments. 148 The downside is that such a comprehensive process adds bureaucracy and complexity, requiring high level of multidisciplinary expertise which ends up restricting the participation of developing countries' stakeholders, despite the thorough capacity-building scheme envisioned by the climate change regime. 149 Finally, taken into consideration the wide range of scientific, technical and technological expertise different projects under the CDM may require, the COP/MOP conferred upon the EB the authority to "establish committees, panels, or working groups to assist it in the performance of its functions.".
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For forestry related projects, the EB at its fourteenth meeting agreed to establish an Afforestation and Reforestation Working Group (A&R WG). 151 In assisting the EB, the A&R WG is responsible to comment on proposed new baselines and monitoring methodologies for forestry projects, prepare draft reformatted versions of those approved by the EB, and recommend available options to expand the applicability of approved A/R methodologies. 152 In this sense, the A&G WG works closely and in consonance with the Methodologies Panel (Meth Panel) agreed upon the third meeting of the EB, 153 which is designed to provide the EB with recommendations on guidelines for methodologies and for baselines and monitoring plans, including those for afforestation and reforestation projects. 
iv. Multilateral Investment Institutions
validation and credibility of these new transactions."). 148 See id., at 4 (stressing out the problems inherent to a trading-scheme without commitments for developing countries, in which the commodity has value only for the buyer, but not for the seller) see also Swisher, supra note 27, at 58 ("This situation [lack of commitments for developing countries] makes permit trading problematic, because developing countries would have excess permits to sell to the industrialized countries, creating large North-South cash transfers in exchange for emission rights. This is easy to justify on the basis of equity, but the receipt of these transfers would stimulate economic activities that would counteract emissions reductions"). 149 Multilateral investors are an important element of the CDM forestry institution framework, and also in fomenting carbon markets worldwide. Within the initiatives to launch a forestry carbon market that could be attractive to investors, and project developers in the post-Kyoto, the following are worth mentioning: the Sydney Futures Exchange for forestry-based carbon credits, the GHG tradable permit trading mechanism coordinated by UNCTAD, and the GHG emissions trading programme of the International Petroleum Exchange. 155 These early innovative attempts lead to "the creation of the International Emissions Trading Association, alongside the Emissions Market Association, the Chicago Climate Exchange, and country-level emission trading systems such as in the UK and Denmark." 156 The World Bank launched in 2003 the BioCarbon fund, described as a public/private initiative aiming at delivering "cost-effective emission reductions, while promoting biodiversity conservation and poverty alleviation." 157 The BioCarbon fund is inspired in the previous World Bank Prototype Carbon Fund established in 1999 to promote renewable energy and energy efficiency projects under the CDM. 158 While there are general carbon investment funds currently available worldwide, 159 within the CDM forestry institutional framework, the BioCarbon fund consolidates the World Bank initiative as the main multilateral investment institution, one that involves public and private investors, and is particularly sensitive to social and environmental benefits. One of the core principles of the CDM is that participation is voluntary and dependent upon prior approval by each Party involved. 161 Furthermore, in accomplishing one of the CDM's objectives -assisting developing countries in achieving sustainable development -the COP/MOP requires project developers a formal evaluation issued by the host country of whether a proposed project activity meets its sustainable development goals.authority (DNA). 163 This provision opened up the field for the development of national legal and institutional frameworks by non-Annex I countries desiring to participate in the CDM.
Current Obstacles, Challenges and Impacts (Positives and Negatives) to Forestry Project Activities under the CDM
In light of its controversial nature, forestry activities in the CDM have raised over the past decade many positives and negatives assessments regarding inherent impacts of their implementation. Moreover, the expansion of forestry over afforestation and reforestation activities is also facing political, legal and technical obstacles. 164 This is the case of the U.S. refusal in ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, which added to the EU policy decision undertaken within its Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) of rejecting CDM forestry projects, 165 and the climate change forestry legal limitation to afforestation and reforestation activities, form the core obstacles examined in this section. 
i. U.S. Resistance in Ratifying the Kyoto Protocol
In 1998, the U.S Congress passed Senate Resolution 98 (S.Res.98), "urging the President not to agree to a treaty that did not include binding commitments for developing countries, or that would cause harm to the U.S. economy." 167 In March of 2001, the Bush administration announced the rejection of the Kyoto Protocol, 168 shortly after the U.S. experienced the tragedy of September 11 th . Though not totally clear if the terrorist attack influenced U.S. policies in the climate change regime, some have suggested that the lack of stronger involvement with the Kyoto Protocol over the past years indicates that the tragedy might had shifted U.S.'s focus. 169 For what it represents economically and politically, the U.S. is a major player in any international negotiation. Therefore, the U.S. resistance in accepting the overall provisions of the Kyoto Protocol constitutes a significant political obstacle to the development of forestry activities within the climate change regime. 170 By coming on board, the U.S.
would play a much greater role not only on actively pushing negotiations towards expanding eligible activities for future commitment periods, but also in fomenting the market for forestry certified emissions reductions (CERs).
ii. EU Refusal to Accept CDM Forest and Forestry Project Activities
Effectively starting on 1 January 2005, the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the world biggest GHG domestic emissions trading scheme. 171 The market for CERs created by the EU ETS increased significantly the demand for project activities undertaken in the CDM. Although not for afforestation and reforestation, considering that the provision authorizing the use of CERs expressly excluded those from LULUCF activities. 172 Because most of the countries with established commitments under the Kyoto Protocol are part of the EU, 173 the policy of excluding CERs from forestry project activities is a major obstacle for the enhancement of a stronger market in this area, which inevitably hampers the development of new forestry-based GHG mitigation projects. 
iii. CDM Limitation to Afforestation and Reforestation Project Activities
One of the major obstacles to an ample expansion of land use, land-use change and forestry projects in the CDM for the first commitment period is the legal limitation imposed upon these kinds of activities to merely anthropogenic afforestation and reforestation practices. The preoccupation and over precaution in effectively imposing such limitation made the climate change negotiators to include it in at least three different decisions (Annex to the draft decision 11/CP.7, decisions 17/CP.7, 175 and 19/CP.9 176 ) prior to the first meeting of the Parties, and also in those adopted thereof. 177 Moreover, "[t]he literature regarding forestry as a climate change mitigation strategy suggests that efforts to constrain project-based forestry interventions to reforestation and afforestation projects is technically industrialized country emission targets through higher allowances for sinks, the demand for emission reductions abroad will be much lower than originally anticipated."). 171 Marjan Peeters, The Enforcement of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading in Europe -Reliability Ensured? 3 (Oct. 17, 2006) (paper presented to the Fourth IUCN Colloquium on Environment Enforcement and Compliance) (on file with the author). 172 See EU Directive 2004/101/EC, art. 1(2), supra note 122 ("All CERs and ERUs that are issued and may be used in accordance with the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol and subsequent decisions adopted thereunder may be used in the Community scheme: (b) except for CERs and EURs from land use, land use change and forestry activities."). 173 See UNFCCC annex I, supra note 7 (with the additions made pursuant to decision 4/CP.3). 174 See Costa, supra note 43, at 9 (referring to the fact that an environment of uncertainty affects the appetite for forestry-based GHG mitigation projects in detriment of clean energy and energy efficiency projects). 175 See Decision 11/CP.7, supra note 45, at 54, see also Decision 17/CP.7, supra note 242, at 20. 176 See Decision 19/CP.9, supra note 76, at 13.
inappropriate."
178 Therefore, such limitation constitutes a legal obstacle for the expansion and further developments of LULUCF activities within the climate change regime in future commitment periods.
b. Technical Challenges
According to FAO, the forestry sector is "technically especially challenging in terms of CDM project formulation….". 179 The first substantial decision addressing accountability for domestic action on LULUCF (decision 11/CP.7) in its request to the SBSTA, called for the development of definitions and modalities for including afforestation and reforestation in the CDM, without leaving aside the issues of non-permanence, additionality and leakage. 180 These technical concerns were based on the IPCC work expressed in its 2000 special report on LULUCF. 181 In addition, decision 19/CP.9's requirement that non-Annex I countries shall opt for a definition of forest based on preestablished parameters 182 , added another technical challenge addressed by the FAO Forest and Climate Change Working Paper 4. 
i. Additionality
Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol establishes that emissions reductions from CDM projects have to be "additional to any that would occur in the absence of the certified project activity." 184 The rationale behind additionality lies on the fact that "if developing nation would have undertaken the same emissions reduction projects even in the absence of Annex I investment, the world could have enjoyed the same emissions reductions without the CDM and without giving Annex I countries credits that let them emit more." 185 Aiming at assisting forestry project developers, the Afforestation Reforestation Working Group (AR WG) at its fifth meeting revised a tool for demonstration and assessment of additionality. 186 The CDM Executive Board adopted it at its twenty first meeting as a highly recommended guideline although not mandatory, 187 which shows that considerable progress was made over the past decade and a half.
Verifying whether a project activity meets the additionality requirement is crucial for the emissions trading scheme, and often constitute a technical challenge, especially in the forestry field 188 due to the fact that such natural ecosystems are exposed to innumerous unpredictable natural and anthropogenic factors (e.g., fires, extreme meteorological events, pests, urban sprawling, etc.). 189 Therefore, additionality is a necessary technical burden that needs to be properly addressed in a project-by-project basis. 190 
ii. Domestic Definition of Forest
In the 2000 special report on land use, land-use change and forestry, the IPCC highlighted that a successful forestry carbon offset program would necessarily depend on clear definitions of forest and forestry activities. The definitions of forest varied considerably among countries based on different criteria (e.g., legal, administrative, or cultural consideration). 191 Nonetheless, for the successful implementation of LULUCF it was crucial to harmonize the definitions for the climate change regime. 192 In an attempt to harmonize domestic definitions, the annex to the draft decision attached to decision 19/CP.9 imposed as a mandatory requirement that countries define forest prior to participating in the CDM. This provision allowed some flexibility for the Parties in defining forests to opt for a minimum tree crown cover, land area, and tree height between numbers varying from 10 to 30 per cent, 0.05 to 1 hectare, and 2 to 5 meters, respectively. 193 The rationale behind this was to provide the Parties some margin to adjust their domestic definition accordantly to their natural and geographic realities. An international uniform definition would not be able to encompass the enormous variety of ecosystems around the world, and would inevitably end up favoring some countries in detriment of others. 194 Soon after adopted, then, the definition requirement became another technical challenge inherit to forestry activities in the CDM. In 2006, FAO issued its Forest and Climate Change Working Paper 4 specifically addressing the issue of choosing a forest definition for the CDM, and presenting recommendations for a country to choose the best parameters to the definition of forest, based on the criteria that would better serve the interests of a non-Annex I Party when participating in the CDM. 195 Proper selection of parameters, conceived by the Marrakesh Accords in defining forests, has a direct effect on eligible areas for afforestation and reforestation projects, and reflects the evolution of the topic, while adding another technical challenge upon participant Parties and developers.
iii. Defining Baseline and Monitoring Methodologies
Complex enough by nature, baseline scenarios and monitoring methodologies 196 are even more challenging in the ambit of afforestation and afforestation activities than they are for renewable energy and energy efficiency projects. 197 The credibility of the CERs from afforestation and reforestation projects is constantly at stake due to anthropogenic and naturally-occurring phenomena that can disturb the project. 198 As a result, up-to-date there are just over 5 approved baseline and monitoring methodologies for afforestation and reforestation projects, against more than 50 for energy efficiency and renewable energy activities. 199 Thus, the regulatory development of standards for determining baselines and monitoring methodologies is a remarkable evolution in the CDM forestry legal framework, but also a major and necessary technical challenge.
iv. Non-Permanence / Reversibility & Leakage
Two additional technical challenges typical to forestry project activities are nonpermanence and leakage 200 . Based on the experience provided by the AIJ pilot phase, the 2000 IPCC special report on LULUCF identified the lack of proper addressability of nonpermanence and leakage by project developers. 201 Almost five years latter, the forestry legal framework adopted in Milan at COP-9 evolved by expressly incorporating "leakage" as long as it can be measured (there must be an outside damage, and it must be quantified) and attributable (causation) to the forestry project activity. 202 As to the reversibility issue, the Parties adopted IPCC's second recommendation by imposing a minimum crediting period of 20 years with the possibility of being renewed twice, and a maximum of 30 years without renewal. 
c. Environmental Impacts
According to the 2000 IPCC special report on LULUCF, forestry projects in the CDM "aiming to mitigate climate change may provide socioeconomic and environmental benefits primarily within project boundaries, although they may also pose risks of negative impacts". 204 These impacts can be of environmental, socio-economic and cultural nature.
i. Conversion of Forested Areas into Plantations, Grazing, and Agricultural Land
The expansion of allowable forestry activities could encourage replacement of mature old grown forests by fast growing tree plantations, and conversion into cropland and grazing land with higher rates of carbon sequestration potentials. 205 While limited to afforestation and reforestation projects, the risks are diminished based on the own definitions of these activities provided by the climate change regime. 206 The rationale for establishing a historical baseline is to avoid deforestation of mature forests for subsequent re-growth for CDM carbon credit purposes. 207 On the other hand, if the CDM legal framework is properly used (and the practice is already demonstrating positive actions) 208 it can provide the means to avoid harmful conversions. One possibility for subsequent commitment periods would be the inclusion in the CDM of accountability for the carbon net source of deforestation practices before any replacement and/or conversion of forested land into fast-growing tree plantation, grazing and cropland management. 209 Another would be allowing for forest preservation and conservation projects under the CDM. 210 Mature forests do not have the same sequestration potentials, but credits could be conferred upon carbon storage. 211 In this case, though, some degree of flexibility in the "human-induced" criterion would have to be provided. 212 In any event, preserving the role of the CDM EB, and strengthening the CDM forestry legal framework are necessary requirements to expanding the list of permissible LULUCF activities in future commitment periods.
ii. Biodiversity
Considering the abovementioned threats of harmful conversions, the impacts on biodiversity have the potential to be catastrophic. To the contrary, if actions are well articulated taken into consideration existing ecosystems protective provisions, in addition with forest conservation projects for future commitment periods, the impacts can be rather positive ones. 213 Therefore, the climate change regime shall be seen as an important available tool by different stakeholders involved with biodiversity conservation, rather than an obstacle that has to be overcome.
iii. Natural Ecosystems
Either positively or negatively, CDM forestry project activities also have the potential to impact natural ecosystems. Among potential threats posed by forestry projects to natural ecosystems are introduction of invasive alien species, 214 increases in erosion processes, 215 and adverse impacts on water supplies. 216 The synthesis report on projects undertaken in the pilot phase reflected positive impacts on natural ecosystems, such as "improving water quality and reducing erosion of hydrological issues." 217 In this sense, worth noticing that the same provisions in the climate change regime designed to protect biodiversity are extended to the protection of natural ecosystems. 218 
iv. Leakage
Leakage, in addition to constituting a technical challenge for the trading scheme, also has the potential to adversely impact the environment. Taking the hypothetical example of a reforestation project in a degraded pasture land; if the replacement of the pasture land into forested area leads to the practice of deforestation elsewhere for the creation of new grazing land, the area deforested faces significant environmental impacts. 
d. Socio-Economic Impacts
An analysis of the socio-economic impacts is required whenever deemed relevant by the host country or the project participants. 220 For the purpose of this section, socioeconomic impacts of forestry projects are examined in light of capacity-building related to employment opportunities and/or job losses, international trade, financial return to local entities, and financial public and private forestry subsidies.
i. Capacity-building & Transfer of Sound Technology
Due to the complexities of the CDM forestry mechanism, 221 and the consequent demand for high qualified technical personnel, in addition to the implementation of new technologies, forestry projects in developing country could lead to job losses, or open employment opportunities mainly for developed countries personnel instead. 222 But one important element to dissuade this premise is that for these types of project activities the involvement of local communities is a quasi requirement for the achievement of the desired positive effects. 223 Consequently, and based on previous experiences undertaken during the pilot phase, the likely trend is that forestry project activities will significantly increase capacity-building and employment opportunities in developing countries, as well as benefit local communities with transfer of new and sound technologies. 
ii. International Trade
Presumably, only "[p]rojects affecting the supply of timber products or consumption of energy services, for example, can affect price signals for the rest of the market, potentially counteracting a portion of the calculated benefits of the original project." 225 This means that the currently allowed afforestation and reforestation project activities have little or no potential to affect international trade, because the timber products such projects are generating did not exist in the first place, adding to the fact that they have to undergo undisturbed 226 . Therefore, they could not possibly impact the existing timber market. 227 Nonetheless, during the discussions for upcoming commitment periods on to whether or not to allow for other LULUCF activities, such as forest conservation and management, harmonized policies and actions between the climate change regime and other international forest forums are strongly recommended. 
iii. Local Participation & Financial Return to Local Stakeholders
Any potential interference with the needs of local stakeholders caused by a CDM forestry activity has not only to be properly assessed, but generate enough income capable of offsetting eventual losses. 229 Even before the tighter regulation on modalities and procedures for forestry projects in the CDM adopted at COP.9, 2004, 230 the IPCC in its 2000 special report had identified that enabling local stakeholders to share the financial benefits of CDM forestry activities was a necessary social condition. 231 A significant regulatory step towards the implementation of a framework that could effectively embrace profitability to local participation was the provision for small-scale afforestation and reforestation projects, targeting low-income communities and individuals. 232 While the international legal work is already in place, added the factor that the practice is still incipient 233 , the challenges for upcoming commitment periods are promising and include: firstly, considerations over profitability sharing in forest management and conservation projects, allowing also for local participation in the decision-making process at all levels (from project conception to project implementation and management) 234 ; and secondly, domestic policies and measures harmonized with the international legal framework so as to allow local communities to benefit from forestry project activities. 235 
iv. Domestic CDM Forestry Subsidies
A domestic CDM forestry subsidy scheme harmonized with the climate change international legal framework is a powerful incentive tool for current afforestation and reforestation projects, and also for other LULUCF activities eventually included in upcoming commitment periods. This harmonization should start with the elimination of conflicting domestic subsidies as directed by the Parties at COP/MOP-1; 236 for example, domestic legislation penalizing forest conservation and promoting land clearance (deforestation) for agricultural purposes and urban sprawl. 237 Worth noticing, that public subsidies are not limit to financial support. Rather they may encompass a variety of different governmental encouragement actions such as direct payment in cash, goods or services to forest landowners for promoting carbon sequestration, purchase of land or land interests, implementation of general forest management service programmes, among others. 238 Thus, national public subsidies to LULUCF project activities shall be planned not only accordantly to the international legal framework, but also to other domestic subsidies for forest management generally.
Overcoming Obstacles and Adverse Impacts of Forest and Forestry Project Activities Under the CDM for Upcoming Commitment Periods
Overall, if well managed and implemented, project-based forest and forestry activities in the CDM beyond just afforestation and reforestation practices can serve many environmental, social and economic purposes and benefit small rural and poor communities and individuals. The political, policies, legal and technical challenges and obstacles, and risks of forest management and conservation projects to biodiversity, watersheds or to promoting deforestation are overcome by the positives impacts. 239 This section, then, is dedicated to examining trends and proposing actions for future commitment periods.
a. Potential Upcoming Trends to Overcoming Political, Policies and Legal Obstacles
In overcoming the U.S. resistance to the Kyoto Protocol, two possibilities can play a major role. First, the 2006 U.S. congressional election saw the Democratic Party take the majority from the Republicans, which could indicate a Democratic victory in the 2008 presidential election. Based on the Democratic sensibility to climate change, and considering that the Clinton administration signed the Kyoto Protocol but faced a Republican Congress, one could expect that the U.S. is much more likely to ratify the Protocol. 240 With respect to the EU, two factors indicate that it will not easily accept forestry activities in the CDM in future commitment periods. The EU refusal to accept credits from forestry project-activities in the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) Directive is the first clear indication. 241 But also, should the afforestation and reforestation limitation be maintained in the CDM in future commitment periods, the language used in the ETS suggests that is not likely that the EU will accept the expansion of allowable activities. 242 In the EU ETS Directive legislators used the term LULUCF instead of just afforestation and reforestation, 243 what indicates that the EU, already anticipating future attempts to broadening the scope of forestry projects in the CDM, opted to exclude them all in advance from its ETS.
Finally, currently CDM forestry activities limitation to afforestation and reforestation projects can legally be overcome for future commitment periods. Decision 11.CP.7 provides that the limitation is valid for the first commitment period only, and that the Parties should decide upon new LULUCF activities for upcoming commitment periods. In the topic of CDM forestry activities, in light of environmental, social and political implications arising internationally from the climate change debate, it is crucial that the legal regime create links beyond the Liaison Group envisioned to coordinate actions amongst the Rio Conventions (UNFCCC, CBD, and UNCCD). 245 Stronger communications channels ought to be opened with the World Bank and International Labor Organization (ILO) on the potential implications and benefits of project-based forestry activities on employment conditions and opportunities, following the example set by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). 246 On the crosscutting issues of biodiversity and CDM forestry projects, FAO has provided a paradigm to be followed in the socio-economic area by developing a specific study on the interlinkages between biological diversity and climate change. 247 Firmer institutional cooperation beyond interconnected environmental areas would help to prevent poor social conditions such as the ones threatening the credibility of CDM biofuels and biomass project activities. The importance of an environmental impact assessment, and in the CDM forestry context also a socio-economic impact assessment, is doubtless. Nonetheless, two major factors appear to limit the power of climate change negotiators to go beyond merely requiring preliminary analyses instead of an impact assessment before any risk can be potentially foreseen. The first one is a legal limitation. Article 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration clearly states that countries have the sovereign right to exploit their own natural resources, pursuant to their own environmental policies. 249 In addition, Principle 17 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, while embracing EIA, establishes that it shall be conducted when the proposed activity is likely to adversely impact the environment. 250 The second factor limiting climate change negotiators to require an impact assessment as a starting pre-condition to project validation seems to be of policy nature. That is, the whole validation, verification and certification process for afforestation and reforestation projects are already overburdensome, bureaucratic, and time consuming in nature, and also present high procedural costs. Adding an environmental and socialeconomic impact assessment for those projects that, at first, do not present the risk for any adverse impacts would make CDM forestry activities practically unfeasible in light of the aforementioned legal, political, policies and technical obstacles already in place. Good governance in the CDM forestry can be achieved by supporting domestic legislation to enhance the role of sinks in the climate change legal regime, 252 which includes inter alia: developing instruments to combat corruption, regulating ownership and management of public forested areas, and reconciling the interests of private owners (land tenure), promoting education, training and public awareness, and ensuring transparency. 253 Those are key elements for the success of the CDM forestry scheme for the upcoming, and most importantly, during the debates for subsequent commitment periods. 254 The positive interaction of the aforementioned socio-economic elements with the forestry practice is crucial in overcoming the obstacles and challenges faced by the CDM forestry activities for future commitment periods.
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Conclusion
Forest and forestry projects in the CDM were extremely controversial during the climate change negotiations, and the result was a legal limitation to only afforestation and reforestation practices. The main concerns included the fact that forest and forestry activities are difficult to monitor, provided cheap carbon credits inhibiting stronger domestic mitigation action, and the fear that those projects could lead to deforestation.
However, the fact is that CDM forest and forestry projects can provide benefits that overcome their downsides. Among the benefits, if flexibility on the human-induced requirement is allowed for future commitment periods, forest conservation projects can help fostering biodiversity, and sustainable forestry practices can provide positive revenue alternatives for local communities.
In order for that to occur, current obstacles such as the U.S. resistance in ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, the EU refusal in accepting CDM LULUCF credits, and the legal limitation on the allowable practices need to be overcome. At the same time, technical challenges, including additionality, defining baseline and monitoring methodologies, choosing a domestic definition for forest, overseeing issues of non-permanence and leakages, while extremely tight, are necessary instruments to assure the positive outcomes of forestry projects capable of softening the resistance for upcoming commitment periods.
